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Do you agree that power, unlike authority, should apply only to relationships where there is a conflict of interests?
It could be said, that politics is the study of the locus of power - where power lies, or should lie. This encompasses all the main questions of political theory: Liberty, in to what extent the state should have power over the individual; justice, in looking at in what circumstances power has been used illegitimately; democracy, in the mechanisms of how state power should be rightly yielded. Even topics such as the communitarian/liberal debate can be seen to boil down to a question of power, in this case, similar to the study of liberty, the balance between individual and community power is at the core of this question.
The question above raises a specific point about the actual definition of power, to what extent is the concept of power inherently linked to a 'conflict of interests'. This question requires a close examination of power itself, and the first step in doing this is to look at Steven Lukes' distinction between one-, two-, and three-dimensional views of power.
In his seminal work, Power: A Radical View, Lukes goes about deriving a definition of power in three stages. The first is the 'one-dimensional' definition of power. This is based on attempts by political scientists such as Dahl to define power in such a way so that it is possible to observe how power operates in empirical examples. The core of this view of power is the statement 'A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not other wise do'. This view of power can be described as behaviourist in that it requires acts of power to involve observable behaviour. This observable behaviour takes the form of actual decisions on issues. One other very important aspect of this one-dimensional view that is specifically relevant to this question is that it requires an observable conflict of interests. The qualification in the statement above that states that the act that A gets B to is one the B would not otherwise do directly implies that the act is in A's interests, but not in B's. This shows that under this one-dimensional view of power, power occurs only when there is a conflict of interests , and to make this simple for political scientists to observe, the definition is such that it ensures this conflict of interests is observable.
It is also the case that a conflict of interests is required in Lukes' two-dimensional view of power. This view is derived from views that attempt to dispute the behaviourist standpoint of the one-dimensional view, but do not fully discount the behavioural aspect of observing power. The main difference between the two- and one- dimensional views of power is that the two-dimensional view takes into account what Bachrach and Baratz refer to as 'nondecisions '. These are cases where power is exerted by agenda control, such as issues being left off the agenda of political discussion. This means that acts involving power become far more difficult to observe, in that it may be difficult for a sociologist to discover if a lack of political controversy in one issue is due to a nondecision, i.e. it is simply left off the agenda by those who decide it, or it is the result of a real consensus. This does not, however, completely remove the behaviourist aspect of power. It would, at least theoretically, be possible for a student of power, when examining one particular, small-scale act of power, to interview the actor in the power equation and discover if there was real consensus, or an instance of nondecision.
In other respects, the two-dimensional view of power is very similar to the one-dimensional view, in that it still requires there to be an observable conflict of interests, although a slightly less easily observed conflict in cases of nondecision. Also, due to the nature of nondecisions, it is no longer necessary for the conflict to be over political issues, but allows for potential issues to be the base of conflict.
Lukes puts forward his own thesis on the nature of power in his tree-dimensional view. His addition to the two-dimensional view is that he allows for power in the form of manipulation of people's wants. He claims that this is an example of power at its greatest - the ability of someone to manipulation people's opinions so to keep certain issues off the agenda. This may take many different forms, including the power of educators, spiritual leaders, the mass media, and even simple community pressure, all of which can and do influence and manipulate us in such a way as to shape our value system and our wants. If it is possible for someone or a group of people to control one or more of these tools of manipulation, then it is clear that they possess power.
The addition of this in the three-dimensional view of power has a significant effect on the properties of the definition. Firstly, it is no longer behaviourist. If someone's wants are being manipulated, then their actions may either be indicative of a genuine want in the real interests of that individual, or the result of some form of want manipulation. The three-dimensional view also has significant consequences for the answer of the question above. The possibility of manipulation of wants means that it is no longer possible to observe conflict in all cases of power. This does not mean that, according to the three-dimensional view of power, there may be cases of power where there is no conflict of interests. Lukes here suggests that there may be a 'latent' conflict between the one with power, and the individual's 'real interests'. These would be interests that only concern the individual - they are purely the result of the individual's existence, and their own value-system, as opposed to one imposed by a powerful external source.
This point raises the question of how best to define a 'conflict of interest', as mentioned in the question. Lukes clearly defines 'real interests' as distinct from an individual's wants, in that he claims that wants can be manipulated by external actors, while an individual's 'real interests' are person specific, and may not be totally consistent with the person's actions. One worry with Lukes use of 'latent' conflict is that it seems to be a possible excuse for tyranny. As In Lukes' three-dimensional view of power it is possible for wants to be manipulated, and for a persons actions to be inconsistent with their 'real interests', then it may be possible for a totalitarian state to manipulate opinions and wants so that the populace believe that the state may oppress and repress in order to ensure that people act in their 'real interests'. It must be noted that in terms of the question posed, the three-dimensional view of power still requires there to be a conflict of interests in every case of power, but allows for that conflict to sometimes be in a 'latent' form.
The other term that is used in the question that requires definition is 'authority'. Now that the three-dimensional view has been derived, it is possible to define authority in Lukes' terms. In essence, authority is power whereby the individual or group with power, is empowered in full accordance with our value-systems. This means that authority is power we have agreed to have held over us, in other words, the fact that a certain institution has authority does not conflict with our 'real interests'. At this stage, using the definitions defined by Lukes, we must agreed with the statement in the question, that power, unlike authority, occurs only where there is a conflict of interests.
It is important at this stage to show that there are other political philosophers who define power in very different terms from Lukes. These difference stem from the fact that Lukes investigates only one of two branches of power often cited by scholars of politics, 'power over' and 'power to'. Lukes thesis is based upon an investigation of how situations can be explained in which one person can be said to have 'power over' another. There are other theses proposed that begin with looking at 'power to'. An example of this is put forward by Talcott Parsons.. These are based in statements such as power as a 'specific mechanism operating to bring about changes in actions of other units in the processes of social interaction'. In this case power is put in terms that are much closer to those of influence and encouragement. This brings out that much of the argument over power is caused by that fact that it is linguistically a very broad term, and thus causes many difficulties in definition. The advantage of Lukes' thesis is that it puts power into terms so that an answer to the above question may be reached fairly easily. Other definition of power, including 'power to', would lead to a conclusion that it is not necessary for there to be a conflict of interest in every case of an act of power.
The fact that it is such a broad term means that power may be seen as a fundamental in the study of theoretical politics. As in the opening passage above, politics is the study of the locus of power. In order to reach a conclusion in this essay, however, it is necessary to define power in more specific terms. According to Lukes' thesis, these is a conflict of interests in every case of power. That conflict may not be observable, however, in that it may be 'latent conflict' due to a manipulation of a person's wants. If, however, power is taken to include 'power to', then this is not the case. The fact that I have the power to leave the room may not have to conflict with anyone else's 'real interests'. If, also, interests are taken to mean a person's wants, as opposed to Lukes' 'real interests', then 'latent conflict' no longer exists, and manipulation of wants no longer involves such a conflict. In the end, however, it is clear that this question rest upon how willing the political philosopher is to restrict the definition of power. If we are dealing with only 'power over', then there is always a conflict of interest, if we include power to, then conflict is not always necessarily present in acts of power.