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How can scepticism be countered?
Philosophical inquiry, when carried to logical extremes, seems to always arrive at a state in which the inquirer is left with no possible knowledge. This is the state of scepticism - where one is left questioning everything, and thus being left with nothing. The label of 'sceptic' is inauspicious for a philosopher, as it implies a belief that leaves us with a universe which seems very unfamiliar, and so the philosopher's task of accurately describing what he sees, appears to have been unfulfilled, if that philosopher is labelled a sceptic. It shall be seen, however, that by using accepted methods of reason and inquiry, it is very difficult to avoid scepticism. The task of avoiding the trap of scepticism, and removing that label from many great philosophers, seems to be the task of many contemporary philosophers.
If we take the definition of scepticism to be the position that states one can not know anything, then a working definition of knowledge is required. Here, knowledge shall be taken in a fairly strict form, in that knowledge of an object is an idea of that object held in the mind, caused either directly or through a complete causal chain by the object itself - this means that the knowledge must be true. It is important for the sceptic that included in this definition of knowledge is that we must be sure of it, and be justified in our surety. This, admittedly, is a very strict definition of knowledge, but as this kind of knowledge is most sound, as humans, we would like to be allowed by the philosopher for it to be possible to posses. For example, I would like to be able to say I am definitely sure that I have knowledge that there is a chair below me. It sounds absurd that I may not be sure, but a sceptic would be able to argue that in fact I was not sure, and I would not be able to completely and reasonably dispute him.
It is possible, however, to show that, in sense, I can have some form of this strict knowledge; in the area of sense perception. I have no doubt that as I look at this paper I perceive black and white arranged in a certain pattern. I can be totally sure of this perception, as perceiving is a mental action, and thus is immediately evident to my mind, and can not be doubted. The problem of scepticism arises in the move from, 'I perceive a chair below me', to 'there is a chair below me'. The most simple way to raise this doubt is by referring to Descartes - it is possible that I may be dreaming, or possibly a malicious demon controls what my senses pick up, and there is in fact no chair below me, simply a vivid hallucination. If even the most immediate perceptions can be hallucinations, then it is not possible to be aware of the external world - everything external to us is dubitable. External propositions - propositions other than immediate perceptions - are allowable under scepticism, although in a very weak form. A sceptic puts them down to instinct, habit, passion or imagination.
There are several ways that scepticism can be avoided, which generally fall into three clear areas; dogmatism, reductionism and apriorism. The first of these is the simplest, yet least satisfactory. A dogmatist avoids scepticism by simply ignoring any logical gap between sense-data and external knowledge. This doctrine usually has the tone of fierce indignation, refusing to allow philosophers to nullify 'things that we clearly know'. There are clear problems with this philosophy, and so this is not a satisfactory way of avoiding scepticism, as it is guilty of worse philosophical atrocities than scepticism. By simply refusing to question knowledge that is deemed 'clear', two important objections are raised - firstly what are the criteria for 'clearness', secondly what excuse has a philosophy for deliberately not questioning something.
The second method of avoiding scepticism is far more promising. Reductionism defines our use of language such that our statements all relate back to what we can actually know, in other words, our original sense data. For example, induction, for a reductionist is a matter of clearly explaining what the piece of induced knowledge is, in terms of the sense-data upon which the induction is based. For example, when I claim I know that 'when suspended objects are released they fall', a reductionist would claim that the actual knowledge I posses is not that every object will fall when dropped, but that every suspended object I have seen has dropped when released, and that no object has broken this rule. This doctrine is also not very satisfactory as it does not allow us to make predictions based on past experience. Reductionists believe that sense-data provides us with all we can know, and therefore anything that is unperceivable is unknowable, and events in the future are not perceivable, and therefore are unknowable.
A much more promising way of avoiding scepticism is through the use of a priori assumptions. These assumptions can take the form of Descartes' principle of God as a non-deceiver, or similar concepts such as the uniformity of the universe over time. These concepts are required for empirical reason - to convert sense-data into general rules which can be used to explain and predict events. The main problem with this method of countering scepticism is that these a priori assumptions are not logical in origin, and therefore the sceptic will have the complaint that knowledge based on these assumptions is unreasonable. A way of adjusting this doctrine is to use what is referred to as confirmationism. Under this doctrine, these assumptions must be used only so long as they are confirmed by sense-data. This means that the inquirer must test these assumptions, and not be afraid to refine and modify them to better suit what is perceived. The clearest problem with this doctrine is the tension between assuming a rule in order to have empirical knowledge, but then using empirical knowledge to refine, modify or even refute these assumptions. This seems to play into the sceptics trap of indicating that there is no a priori knowledge.
An examination of these two doctrines above show the problems in avoiding scepticism. In the first case, with reductionism, in order to have knowledge, it must be restrained to knowledge of perception. This is not perfect, but is logically viable, and so the sceptic will have no issue with the method by which this doctrine is derived. The main problem is the restrained definition of knowledge - much weaker than the desired knowledge stated at the outset of this analysis. The second way out of scepticism, confirmationism, instead of compromising in the definition of knowledge, compromise arises in the use of unreasonable assumption. It appears, therefore, that in order to avoid scepticism, the very strict methods of inquiry used by the sceptic must be watered down. If they are adhered to in there strictest form, then even the clearest and most obvious fact of life loses its factual basis.